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7 October 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Desmond Fitzgerald
Chief, PP Staff, DDP

SUBJECT : Proposed USIA Campaign on Disarmament

1. I have circulated the USIA memorandum of 24 September and the "thematic" annex to a number of the senior analysts in the DDI Area. Their comments are attached in case you or your staff might find useful ideas in them.

2. From my standpoint, the major difficulty with the proposed USIA Program, a point made by some of the other memoranda, is that the program is apparently designed to sell a package instead of basic US objectives. During the time that the 29 August four-power paper was being prepared, the US Delegation in London looked on it as a negotiating document. It was recognized that if negotiations were broken off, the paper would be a very useful tool in the defense of our position on disarmament in the current session of the UN, but the paper was not designed specifically for this purpose.

3. In addition to the foregoing general comment, I would like to put forward the following specific points:

a. The 24 September memorandum says that the four-power plan "offers the only hope of reducing the enormous arms spending ...". I think that you will agree that this statement is obviously not true, and that we might have difficulty convincing a great many people if we attempted to follow this line.

b. As I mentioned to you the other day, I think that we should be extremely careful in the way in which we handle the issue of the suspension or cessation of nuclear testing. A great many things affecting this issue might happen in the near future, which would make some of the ideas contained in the USIA Program out of date.

c. The US Delegation in London tried to avoid the use of term "arms race" since this is a Soviet propaganda gambit and the US does not recognize that it is engaged in arms race with the Soviet Union.

d. US policy does not at this time envisage the destruction of all nuclear weapons. We are prepared, however, to make a beginning if the Soviet Union will do so, too. The USIA document overstates the extent to which we are willing to carry this program.

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e. We should be careful in talking about our need for nuclear weapons to counter-balance the superiority of the conventional forces of the Soviet bloc, since the Soviet Union has been advocating lower levels of conventional forces than the US is prepared to agree to.

f. In discussing the problem of political settlements, the US has been careful to avoid identifying any specific policy issue as a prerequisite for the second and third stages of disarmament. The Soviet Union has claimed that we were making Germany a prerequisite for the second and third stages. In actual fact, we have not done this, and I rather think we would have some difficulty in getting the British and French to agree if we would try to do so.

h. For whatever use it may be, I am also forwarding a copy of a draft prepared by the Disarmament Staff for possible use by Ambassador Lodge if the debate in the UN were to get rough enough to permit use of a speech with this tone.

W. A. TIDWELL.